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Abstract
Eﬃcient risk-sharing rules and equilibria between two agents with
utilities in a class that contains the Rank Dependent Expected Util-
ity (RDU) are fully characterized. Speciﬁc attention is given to the
RDU. Call-spreads and contracts with mixed regimes are shown to be
eﬃcient. Closed-form solutions are obtained for several examples.
1 Introduction
A fundamental issue of economics of uncertainty has been the allocation of
contingent goods among consumers. In the literature, agents have mainly
been assumed to be expected utility maximizers (denoted EU from now on)
with homogeneous probability beliefs. Risk-sharing and pricing rules have ex-
tensively been discussed in that framework and numerous applications given
to asset pricing and insurance (see Huang and Litzenberger [14] and Gollier’s
[12] textbooks and the references therein). However, there are a number of in-
surance indemnity schedules that are commonly oﬀered in insurance markets,
which don’t seem to be eﬃcient for the diﬀerentiable von-Neumann Morgen-
stern model. For example, the contract oﬀered by the FDIC to reinsure
American banks againt their losses is a call-spread and gives no reimburse-
ment for low values of the loss, has an upper limit and is linear in between.
Swiss health insurance companies provide no reimbursement for small values
of the loss and, for high values of the loss, the reimbursement equals the loss
minus some ﬁxed amount. In contrast with a standard deductible contract,
the reimbursement is a nonlinear function for intermediate values of the loss.
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1We argued in [2] that the rank dependent expected utility model with
continuous or discontinuous distortions (denoted RDU from now on) could
account for the coexistence of upper limits and deductibles. In this paper,
we go one step further: we fully characterize risk-sharing and pricing rules
between two agents for a class of utility functions that contains the RDU. This
class accounts for call spreads, contracts with mixed regimes that include full
insurance and no insurance for some intervals of the risk. In [3], we showed
that the same class of utility functions could be used to model strangled
demand functions. In this paper, we show that eﬃcient risk-sharing rules are
also frequently strangled.
The class considered is the set of concave utilities of the form
V (X) :=
Z 1
0
L(t,F
−1
X (t))dt + g(F
−1
X (0)) (1)
that are second-order stochastic dominance preserving (henceforth SSD). In
(1), X is a random variable on a non atomic space, (Ω,B,P), with distribu-
tion function FX and F
−1
X is a version of the inverse of FX or quantile of X.
The term g(F
−1
X (0)) = g(essinf X) accounts for a speciﬁc weight given to the
minimal value of X. We refer to Chew and Epstein [6], Green and Jullien
[13] and Chew and Wakker [8] for axiomatic foundations. Following Chew
and Epstein [6], we will call utilities of type (1) Rank-Linear Utilities (hence-
forth RLU). We show that for a utility V of the form (1), SSD preservation
is roughly equivalent to concavity.
The class of utilities of type (1) contains the set of Choquet integrals
of U(X), a concave function of X with respect to a convex distortion f :
[0,1] → [0,1] continuous or discontinuous at 1. When f is discontinuous,
Ef(U(X)) = (1 − f(1−))U(F
−1
X (0)) +
Z 1
0
f
0(1 − t)U(F
−1
X (t))dt (2)
deﬁnes a utility of the type (1) with L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)U(x) and g(x) =
(1−f(1−))U(x) and f(1−)) = limx↑1 f(x). When the distortion is continuous,
the ﬁrst term is zero and g = 0.
In this paper, we consider eﬃcient risk-sharing rules between two agents
having SSD preserving utilities of type (1) and aggregate wealth X0 with
a continuous distribution function FX0. Any non comonotone sharing rule
being dominated by a comonotone sharing rule (see Landsberger and Meilij-
son [15]), attention may be restricted to comonotone sharing rules, hence to
pairs of non decreasing functions of aggregate risk. In [4], it is shown that
the problem of eﬃcient risk-sharing rules may be brought down a calculus
2of variations problem with two monotonicity constraints. This problem, new
in the economics literature, may be solved by using a generalization of the
ironing procedure of Mussa and Rosen [16]. More precisely, there is a parti-
tion of the set of values of aggregate risk into:
-sub-intervals on which the consumption of agent 1 is constant hence, on
which agent 2 bears the full risk,
-sub-intervals on which the consumption of agent 2 is constant hence, on
which agent 1 bears the full risk,
-sub-intervals on which both consumptions are increasing functions of the
risk and determined by ﬁrst-order conditions.
As a by-product of our method, we are able to compute prices supporting
eﬃcient allocations. These prices are increasing functions of aggregate en-
dowment. They are proportional to the marginal utility of the agent whose
consumption is increasing in X0.
Special attention is paid in the paper to the RDU case. We recall that
the Choquet expectation with respect to a convex distortion f corresponds
to the multiple priors model where the priors are the densities that dominate
f0 in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance (see [2]). Therefore, we
shall say that two agents with respective (smooth) distortions f1 and f2 have
similar beliefs (or that there is weak heterogeneity of beliefs) whenever the
function
(ln(f
0
2))
0 − (ln(f
0
1))
0 =
f00
2
f0
2
−
f00
1
f0
1
is small. Deﬁning agent i’s uncertainty aversion index as f00
i /f0
i, agents thus
have similar beliefs whenever they have similar uncertainty aversion indices.
As an application of our method, we prove that when there is weak hetero-
geneity of beliefs, agents behave as if they were expected utility maximizers
with heteregeneous beliefs having densities f0
i(1−FX0(X0)),i = 1,2 with re-
spect to P. In particular, when f1 = f2 (no heterogeneity), agents behave as
EU maximizers with probability f0(1 − FX0(X0)). If, on the contrary, there
is very high heterogeneity of agents’ beliefs, then the more uncertainty averse
agent is fully insured by the other. For example if one RDU agent has a
high uncertainty aversion index while the other is EU, then the RDU agent
is fully insured by the EU agent.
The results just stated assume global properties of agents’ distortions.
Focusing on local properties of agents’ distortions, we show that, when one
agent distorts much more small probabilities than the other, she is fully
insured for high values of aggregate endowment.
3In the case of discontinuous distortions, we prove that one of the agent
must be fully insured for low values of aggregate endowment. In the case
where one agent is averse to the worse state and the other is not, then the
former is fully insured for low values of aggregate endowment. Aversion to
the worse state or high distortion of large probabilities induces a minimal
consumption while high distortion of low probabilities induces satiation. For
a general pair of distortions, eﬃcient risk-sharing exhibit several regimes as
described in the ironing procedure above.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce utilities of
type (1) and state some of their properties. We characterize SSD preserving
utilities of type (1) and discuss their diﬀerentiability properties. In section
3, the risk-sharing and equilibria problems are brought down to a calculus
of variations problem with two monotonicity constraints. Section 4 provides
optimality conditions and ﬁrst applications. Section 5 is devoted to risk-
sharing between two RDU. In section 6, we study two examples of risk-
sharing rules and equilibria: an RLU example and an example of logarithmic
utilities and power distortions.
2 On rank linear utility functionals
2.1 Deﬁnitions
Given as primitive is a probability space (Ω,B,P). Let X be a random
variable and let FX(t) = P(X ≤ t), t ∈ R be its distribution function. The
generalized inverse of FX is deﬁned by:
F
−1
X (0) = essinf X and F
−1
X (t) = inf{z ∈ R : FX(z) ≥ t}, for all t ∈ (0,1]
We recall that X dominates Y in the sense of second order stochastic
dominance (SSD), denoted X2Y , if E(U(X)) ≥ E(U(Y )), for every utility
function u : R → R concave nondecreasing and X strictly dominates Y in
the sense of SSD (notation X2Y ) if E(U(X)) > E(U(Y )) for every strictly
concave nondecreasing utility function U. We also recall that X2Y if and
only if
Z 1
0
g(s)F
−1
X (s)ds ≥
Z 1
0
g(s)F
−1
Y (s)ds, ∀g : [0,1] → R+ nonincreasing, (3)
and that X2Y if and only if the inequality is strict in (3), for every decreas-
ing function g.
4The fact that two random variables X on (Ω,B,P) and Y on (Ω0,B0,P 0)
have the same probability law will be denoted X
d ∼ Y . For a map V :
L∞(Ω) → R ∪ {−∞}, the domain of V is deﬁned by
dom V := {X ∈ L∞(Ω) : V (X) > −∞}.
Deﬁnition 1 1. A map V : L∞(Ω) → R ∪ {−∞} is (strictly) monotone
if X ≥ Y a.e. implies V (X) ≥ V (Y ) (resp. V (X) > V (Y ) whenever
X ≥ Y a.e. and P(X 6= Y ) > 0 and Y ∈dom V ).
2. A map V : L∞(Ω) → R ∪ {−∞} is law invariant if V (X) = V (Y )
whenever X
d ∼ Y .
3. A map V : L∞(Ω) → R ∪ {−∞} (strictly) preserves SSD if X2 Y
implies V (X) ≥ V (Y ) (resp. V (X) > V (Y ) whenever X2 Y and
Y ∈dom V ).
Since X
d ∼ Y is equivalent to X2 Y and Y 2 X, SSD preserving func-
tions are law invariant. As X + Y 2X for any Y ≥ 0,Y 6= 0, SSD pre-
serving functions (strictly SSD preserving functions) are monotone (strictly
monotone). The converse is not true. For a counterexample, see Dana [9].
However, we have the following result proven in Dana [9]:
Proposition 1 Let (Ω,B,P) be non-atomic and let V : L∞(Ω) → R∪{−∞}
be concave, σ(L∞(Ω),L1(Ω)) upper semi-continuous. Then V is SSD preserv-
ing if and only if V is law invariant and monotone.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall assume that (Ω,B,P) is non-
atomic, that is, there exists a random variable U on (Ω,B,P) uniformly
distributed on [0,1].
2.2 Stochastic dominance
In the paper, we consider utilities of the form:
V (X) := VL(X) + g(F
−1
X (0)), (4)
with
VL(X) :=
Z 1
0
L(t,F
−1
X (t))dt, for all X ∈ L
∞(Ω,B,P). (5)
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a utility VL deﬁned by (5) to be
SSD preserving are next provided (the proof is given in the appendix) . For
the sake of simplicity, L is assumed to be smooth.
5Proposition 2 Let (Ω,B,P) be non atomic and VL be of type (5). Let L ∈
C2([0,1] × R). The following are equivalent:
1. VL is SSD preserving,
2. ∂xL ≥ 0, ∂xxL ≤ 0 and ∂txL ≤ 0 on [0,1] × R
3. VL is concave, monotone and σ(L∞(Ω),L1(Ω)) upper semi-continuous.
If, in addition, L(t,.) is strictly concave for every t ∈ [0,1] or ∂txL < 0, then
VL is strictly SSD preserving.
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for X 7→ g(F
−1
X (0)) to be SSD pre-
serving read as follows.
Lemma 1 The map X 7→ g(F
−1
X (0)) is SSD preserving iﬀ g is nondecreas-
ing.
Proof. Since SSD preserving functions are monotone, the monotonicity of
g is a necessary condition. To prove the suﬃciency of this condition, let us
recall that X2Y can be characterized by the inequalities
Z t
0
F
−1
X (s)ds ≥
Z t
0
F
−1
Y (s)ds, ∀t ∈ (0,1).
Since F
−1
X (0) = F
−1
X (0+) = limε→0+ 1
ε
R ε
0 F
−1
X (s)ds, X2Y implies F
−1
X (0) ≥
F
−1
Y (0). Hence if g is nondecreasing, g(F
−1
X (0)) ≥ g(F
−1
Y (0)).
2.3 Choquet integral and RDU
Important examples of utilities of type (4) are given by the Choquet integral
with respect to a (possibly discontinuous) convex distortion (Yaari utility)
and by Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU). A convex distortion is a convex
increasing map f : [0,1] → [0,1] such that f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1. Since f
is convex and f(0) = 0, f is continuous on [0,1[. The Choquet integral of
X ∈ L∞(Ω) with respect to the capacity f(P), denoted Ef(X), is deﬁned by
Ef(X) =
Z 0
−∞
(f(P({X > t})) − 1)dt +
Z ∞
0
f(P({X > t}))dt
Since f is nondecreasing, convex and ﬁnite, it is diﬀerentiable a.e. and f0 ∈
L1
+[0,1]. When f is continuous, one has
Ef(X) =
Z 1
0
f
0(1 − t)F
−1
X (t)dt.
6When f is discontinuous at 1, let f(1−) = limx↑1 f(x) and ˜ f(x) =
f(x)
f(1−)
if x < 1 and ˜ f(1) = 1 (note that ˜ f is continuous). Since Ef is translation
invariant and X + kXk∞ ≥ 0, we may assume that X ≥ 0. We then have:
Ef(X) =
Z essinf (X)
0
f(P(X > t))dt +
Z ∞
essinf (X)
f(P(X > t))dt
=essinf (X) + f(1
−)
"Z ∞
0
˜ f(P(X > t))dt −
Z essinf (X)
0
˜ f(P(X > t))dt
#
=(1 − f(1
−))essinf (X) + f(1
−)E ˜ f(X)
=(1 − f(1
−))F
−1
X (0) +
Z 1
0
f
0(1 − t)F
−1
X (t)dt
.
Hence a Choquet integral with respect to a discontinuous convex distortion
is a utility of type (4) with L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)x and g(x) = (1 − f(1−))x.
It may also be written as an ε-contamination of the Choquet integral with
respect to the continuous convex distortion ˜ f, E ˜ f(X):
Ef(X) = εF
−1
X (0
+) + (1 − ε)E ˜ f(X), with ε := (1 − f(1
−)).
Given a utility index U, the RDU is deﬁned by Ef(U(X)), hence Ef(U(X)) = R 1
0 f0(1 − t)U(F
−1
X (t))dt if f is continuous and
Ef(U(X)) = (1 − f(1
−))U(F
−1
X (0)) +
Z 1
0
f
0(1 − t)U(F
−1
X (t))dt
if f is discontinuous. An RDU is therefore a utility of type (4) with L(t,x) =
f0(1 − t)U(x) and g(x) = (1 − f(1−))U(x). From proposition 2, the RDU
is SSD preserving if and only if U is concave nondecreasing (see also the
seminal paper of Chew et al [7]).
2.4 Diﬀerentiability properties
In this subsection, we identify the superdiﬀerential of a convave utility of
type (5) and the set where it is Gˆ ateaux diﬀerentiable. We assume that L is
of class C2 (see [5] for milder assumptions and proofs) and satisﬁes:
∂xL ≥ 0, ∂xxL ≤ 0, ∂txL < 0 on [0,1] × R.
The superdiﬀerential of VL at X ∈ L∞(Ω) denoted ∂VL(X) is deﬁned by:
∂VL(X) := {µ ∈ (L
∞)
0
: VL(Y ) − VL(X) ≤ hµ,Y − Xi, ∀ Y ∈ L
∞}.
7Let us recall that VL is Gˆ ateaux-diﬀerentiable at X if the map:
Y ∈ L
∞(Ω) 7→ D
+VL(X;Y ) := lim
t→0+
1
t
[VL(X + tY ) − VL(X)]
deﬁnes a continuous linear form on L∞(Ω), denoted V 0
L(X).
The following theorem summarizes the results from [5] that will be used
in the paper:
Theorem 1 Let X ∈ L∞(Ω), then the following holds:
1. ∂VL(X) is a subset of L1
+,
2. ∂VL(X) := co{∂xL(Z,X), Z uniformly distributed, comonotone with X}
where co denotes closed convex hull operation for the L1(Ω) topology,
3. any element of ∂VL(X) is anticomonotone with X,
4. deﬁning ΩX := {ω ∈ Ω : FX is continuous at X(ω)}, for every Ψ ∈
∂VL(X) and a.e. ω ∈ ΩX, one has Ψ(ω) = ∂xL(FX(X(ω)),X(ω)),
5. VL is Gˆ ateaux-diﬀerentiable at X if and only if FX is continuous, in
which case, one has:
∂VL(X) = {V
0
L(X)} = {∂xL(FX ◦ X,X)}.
Let us consider the RDU case. In that case L(t,x) = f0(1 − t)U(x). We
thus obtain (see also [2]) that when VL is Gˆ ateaux-diﬀerentiable, one has:
V
0
L(X) = {f
0(1 − FX ◦ X)U
0(X)}
and in general,
∂VL(X) := co{f
0(1−Z)U
0(X), Z uniformly distributed, comonotone with X}.
Let us now consider the case of terms involving F
−1
X (0) = essinfX in the
utility function. Given g a concave function of class C1 on R such that g0 > 0
on R, let us deﬁne
V0(X) := essinfX, and V (X) := g(V0(X)), ∀X ∈ L
∞.
8It is straightforward to check that V0 and V are concave and continuous
(for the norm topology), hence superdiﬀerentiable. Let us denote by S the
simplex of (L∞)0:
S := {µ ∈ (L
∞)
0
: µ ≥ 0, hµ,1i = 1}.
The following result gives diﬀerentiability properties of V0 and V (see the
appendix for a proof)
Proposition 3 Let X ∈ L∞, then
∂V0(X) = {µ ∈ S : hµ,Xi = essinfX}, moreover ∂V0(X) = ∂V0(g(X)) and
∂V (X) = {µg
0(X) : µ ∈ ∂V0(X)}.
Note that ∂V0(X) ∩ L1 may be empty. When ∂V0(X) ∩ L1 6= ∅, one has:
∂V0(X) ∩ L
1 = {Q ∈ S, Q << P, Q(X = essinfX) = 1}.
In particular ∂V0(X) ∩ L1 6= ∅ implies that P(X = essinfX) > 0.
Since the superdiﬀerential of the sum of continuous concave functions is
the sum of their superdiﬀerentials, we deduce from proposition 3 and theorem
1 the superdiﬀerential of utilities of form (1).
3 Eﬃcient risk sharing and equilibria
3.1 A review of known results
We consider a two agents exchange economy under uncertainty. Let Wi ∈
L∞
+, i = 1,2 be agent’s i initial endowment and X0 := W1 + W2 be the
aggregate endowment. We assume that FX0 is continuous. Agent i is char-
acterized by a utility, Vi : L∞
+ → R assumed to be strictly SSD preserving,
σ(L∞,L1) upper semi-continuous and concave. A feasible allocation is a pair
(X1,X2) ∈ (L∞
+)2 such that X1 + X2 = X0. A feasible allocation (X1,X2)
is (strictly) dominated by the feasible allocation (X0
1,X0
2) if Vi(X0
i) ≥ Vi(Xi)
for every i (with a strict inequality for some i). A Pareto eﬃcient allocation
is a feasible allocation which is not is strictly dominated.
A triple (X∗
1,X∗
2,Ψ∗) ∈ (L∞
+)2 ×(L∞)0
+ with (X∗
1,X∗
2) feasible is an equi-
librium with transfer payments if for i = 1,2, X∗
i solves
maxVi(Xi) s.t. hΨ
∗,Xii ≤ hΨ
∗,X
∗
i i, Xi ∈ L
∞
+.
9We recall that whenever utilities are superdiﬀerentiable, (X∗
1,X∗
2,Ψ∗)
(with (X∗
1,X∗
2) feasible) is an interior equilibrium with transfer payments
iﬀ there exists λ ∈ (0,1) and α > 0 such that
λ∂V1(X
∗
1) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2(X
∗
2) 6= ∅ and αΨ
∗ ∈ λ∂V1(X
∗
1) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2(X
∗
2).
In particular this implies that (X∗
1,X∗
2) solves the problem
(Pλ) sup{λV1(X1) + (1 − λ)V2(X2) : (X1,X2) feasible}
hence is Pareto eﬃcient. We ﬁnally recall that, from Walras’ law, a triple
(X∗
1,X∗
2,Ψ∗) ∈ (L∞
+)2 × (L∞)0
+ with (X∗
1,X∗
2) feasible is an equilibrium if it
is an equilibrium with transfer payments such that
hΨ
∗,X
∗
1i = hΨ
∗,W1i. (6)
Since comonotone feasible allocations play a crucial role in risk-sharing
theory when utilities are SSD preserving, we next recall a few basic results
on comonotonicity.
A feasible allocation (X1,X2) is comonotone (see Denneberg [10]) if and
only if there exists a pair of non decreasing functions (h1,h2) on R such that
h1 + h2 =Id, X1 = h1(X0), and X2 = h2(X0) a.e.. Hence, in this case, one
has:
F
−1
Xi = hi(F
−1
X0), i = 1,2 (7)
Therefore if (X1,X2) is comonotone, as h1 + h2 =Id, we obtain that
x0 =: F
−1
X0 = F
−1
X1 + F
−1
X2 (8)
Since F
−1
X0 is strictly increasing, it follows from (7) that hi(u) = F
−1
Xi ◦
FX0(u), i = 1,2. As Xi = hi(X0),
Xi = F
−1
Xi ◦ FX0(X0), i = 1,2. (9)
Introducing the set:
A := {x : [0,1] → R+, x and x0 − x nondecreasing, 0 ≤ x ≤ x0}, (10)
we deduce from (8) and (9), that the feasible allocation (X1,X2) is comono-
tone if and only if there exists x ∈ A with such that X1 = x(FX0(X0))
and X2 = (x0 − x)(FX0(X0)). Moreover, from (9), one has x = F
−1
X1 and
x0 − x = F
−1
X2.
In the next proposition, we gather the previous facts and a number of
useful well-known results on Pareto optimal allocations.
10Proposition 4 Assume that F
−1
X0 is increasing. Then:
1. Any comonotone feasible pair is of the form (x(FX0(X0)),(x0−x)(FX0(X0)))
for some x ∈ A.
2. Any non comonotone feasible pair is strictly dominated by a comono-
tone feasible pair.
3. A pair (X∗,X0 −X∗) with 0 ≤ X∗ ≤ X0 is Pareto optimal iﬀ it is, for
some λ ∈ [0,1], a solution to
(Pλ) sup{λV1(X) + (1 − λ)V2(X0 − X),0 ≤ X ≤ X0}.
Domination by comonotone pairs was originally proven by Landsberger
and Meilijson [15]. Strict dominance has been proven by Carlier and Dana
[1, 2]. Assertion 3 is well-known.
3.2 Reduction to quantiles problems
From proposition 4, attention may be restricted to random variables of the
form X = x(FX0(X0)). Let ˜ vi : B → R be deﬁned by ˜ vi(x) = Vi(x(FX0(X0))).
The functions ˜ vi,i = 1,2 are also concave.
Deﬁning A by (10), let us consider the quantile problem:
( ˜ Pλ) sup{˜ V (x) := λ˜ v1(x) + (1 − λ)˜ v2(x0 − x), x ∈ A}
The next proposition shows that Pareto optimal allocations may be de-
scribed in terms of the solutions to ( ˜ Pλ).
Proposition 5 X∗
λ is a solution of (Pλ) iﬀ X∗
λ = xλ(FX0(X0)) and xλ is a
solution of ( ˜ Pλ).
Proof. Assume that X∗
λ = x(FX0(X0)) solves (Pλ). Let y ∈ A and Y :=
y(FX0(X0)). We have
V (X
∗
λ) = ˜ V (x) ≥ V (Y ) = ˜ V (y)
which shows that x solves ( ˜ Pλ).
Conversely, assume that xλ ∈ A is a solution of ( ˜ Pλ) and let X∗
λ =
xλ(FX0(X0)). Let Y := x(FX0(X0)) for some x ∈ A. We then have
V (X
∗
λ) = ˜ V (xλ) ≥ ˜ V (x) = V (Y ).
Hence X∗
λ is a solution of (Pλ).
113.3 RLU equilibria
In the preceding subsections, utilities were only assumed to be strictly SSD
preserving, σ(L∞,L1) upper semi-continuous and concave. In the remainder
of the section, in order to do explicit computations, utility functions are
assumed to be of the form
Vi(X) =
Z 1
0
Li(t,F
−1
X (t))dt + gi(F
−1
X (0)), i = 1,2
with Li of class C2 on [0,1] × R∗
+ with ∂xLi ≥ 0, ∂xxLi ≤ 0 and ∂txLi <
0 on [0,1] × R∗
+ and gi nondecreasing concave of class C2 on R∗
+. These as-
sumptions ensure that Vi is strictly SSD preserving and superdiﬀerentiable.
The next results show that, as standard in Negishi’s method, interior
equilibria with transfer payments may be parametrized by the utility weight
λ and that they may easily be obtained from the solutions of ( ˜ Pλ).
For x ∈ A, let us deﬁne
bunch(x) := {∪nIn, In open interval of [0,1] s.t. x is constant on In}
and let (bunch(x))c denote the complement of bunch(x) in [0,1].
Proposition 6 Assume that g1 = g2 = 0, then (X∗,X0 − X∗,Ψ∗) is an
interior equilibrium with transfer payments iﬀ there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such
that
1. X∗ = xλ(FX0(X0)) and xλ is a solution of ( ˜ Pλ),
2. Ψ∗ ∈ L1
+ and Ψ∗ is proportional to pλ(FX0(X0)) with
pλ(t) =

λ∂xL1(t,xλ(t)), on (bunch(xλ))c,
(1 − λ)∂xL2(t,(x0 − xλ)(t)) on bunch(xλ).
Proposition 6 enables us to compute prices supporting eﬃcient allocations:
they are are increasing functions of aggregate endowment and more precisely,
they are proportional to the marginal utility of the agent whose consumption
is increasing in X0.
The proof of proposition 6 may be found in the appendix. The previous
characterization may be extended to the case g2 = 0, g1 6= 0 (see the appendix
for a proof):
12Proposition 7 Assume that g2 = 0 and g0
1 > 0, then (X∗,X0 − X∗,Ψ∗) is
an interior equilibrium with transfer payments iﬀ it satisﬁes the conditions
of proposition 6. Moreover, in that case, X∗ = xλ(FX0(X0)) is constant for
low values of X0.
Using (6) and proposition 6, interior equilibria may now easily be char-
acterized:
Proposition 8 Assume that g1 = g2 = 0, then the triple (X∗,X0−X∗,Ψ∗) ∈
(L∞
+)2 × (L1)+ is an interior equilibrium iﬀ
1. X∗ = xλ(FX0(X0)) and xλ is a solution of ( ˜ Pλ) for some λ ∈ (0,1),
2. Ψ∗ is proportional to pλ(FX0(X0)) with
pλ(t) =

λ∂xL1(t,xλ(t)) on (bunch(xλ))c
(1 − λ)∂xL2(t,(x0 − xλ)(t)) on bunch(xλ)
3.
Z 1
0
pλ(t)xλ(t)dt = E[pλ(FX0(X0))W1] =
Z 1
0
pλ(t)φ1(t)dt
with φ1 : [0,1] → R+ deﬁned by φ1(FX0(X0)) = E[W1 | FX0(X0)]
It follows from the previous characterization that existence of equilibria
amounts to ﬁnd a λ ∈ (0,1) such that condition 3. in the previous statement
is satisﬁed. Existence of such a weight is guaranteed by the intermediate
value theorem.
Remark. In the RDU case with continuous distortions
Vi(X) =
Z 1
0
f
0
i(1 − t)Ui(F
−1
X (t))dt, i = 1,2,
prices take the form pλ(t) =

λf0
2(1 − t)U0
2(x0(t) − xλ(t)) on (bunch(xλ))c
(1 − λ)f0
1(1 − t)U0
1(xλ(t)) on bunch(xλ).
As an application of proposition 8, the equilibrium price q(Z) of a risky
asset Z is
q(Z) = E(pλ(FX0(X0))
where λ is a solution of the equation of assertion 3. Normalizing the expected
pricing density to one, we obtain the risk premium of Z:
E(Z)
q(Z)
− 1 = −cov

pλ(FX0(X0)),
Z
q(Z)

.
134 Eﬃciency conditions
4.1 Optimality conditions
It follows from the preceding subsections that for computing risk sharing
rules and equilibria, we are brought down to solving ( ˜ Pλ). This section is
devoted to optimality conditions when utility functions are of the form (5),
equivalently:
˜ vi(x) =
Z 1
0
Li(t,x(t))dt + gi(x(0)), i = 1,2.
From now on, we assume the following:
• For i = 1,2, Li(t,.) is of class C1 on R∗
+ for every t ∈ [0,1] and
∂xLi(.,.) ∈ C0([0,1] × R∗
+,R), gi ∈ C0(R∗
+,R) and gi diﬀerentiable
on R∗
+,
• For every t ∈ [0,1], Li(t,.) is strictly concave increasing on R∗
+, gi is
concave increasing on R∗
+
• the following Inada-type conditions hold:
either lim
x→0+ g
0
i(x) = +∞, or: (11)
lim
(t,x)→(0+,0+)
∂xLi(t,x) = lim
ε→0+
Z δ
0
∂xLi(t,ε)dt = +∞, ∀δ ∈ (0,1). (12)
• x0 is Lipschitz on [0,1].
Let us deﬁne
Lλ(t,x) := λL1(t,x) + (1 − λ)L2(t,x0(t) − x),
gλ(x) := λg1(x) + (1 − λ)g2(x0(0) − x).
Problem ( ˜ Pλ) is then a calculus of variations problem with two monotonicity
constraints:
sup
x∈A
Jλ(x) :=
Z 1
0
Lλ(t,x(t))dt + gλ(x(0)). (13)
Existence of a solution xλ to (13) follows from Ascoli’s theorem and x0 being
Lipschitz. Uniqueness of the solution, xλ, follows from the strict concavity
assumptions. Since elements of A are Lipschitz and Lipschitz functions are
a.e. diﬀerentiable, xλ is a.e. diﬀerentiable. Finally, the Inada conditions (11)
14or (12) ensure that the solution is interior: 0 < xλ(t) < x0(t) for all t ∈ [0,1].
Condition (12) is a weakening of the Inada condition ∂xLi(t,0+) = ∞; it
is motivated by cases such as Li(t,x) := ln(t + x), i = 1,2 (see subsection
6.1), indeed, this utility satisﬁes (12) whereas ∂xL(t,0+) = t−1 ∈ R, for every
t > 0. In the RDU case, Li(t,x) = f0
i(1 − t)Ui(x), and (12) is equivalent to
the usual Inada condition U0
i(0+) = +∞.
Let ˜ xλ be the maximizer of J when the monotonicity constraints are
relaxed, i.e. ˜ x(t) solves:
max{Lλ(t,x): x ∈ R+}. (14)
When ˜ x(t) is interior, it is characterized by
∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0. (15)
Our next aim is to provide a method to explicitely solve ( ˜ Pλ).
Proposition 9 Let x ∈ A and Λλ be deﬁned by:
˙ Λλ(t) = ∂xLλ(t,x(t)), for all t ∈ [0,1],Λλ(0) = 0.
Then x = xλ, the solution of (13), iﬀ the following conditions hold:
(i) (Λλ − Λλ(1))+ ˙ x = 0, a.e.
(ii) (Λλ − Λλ(1))−(˙ x0 − ˙ x) = 0, a.e.
(iii) 0 < x(t) < x0(t) for all t ∈ [0,1], and Λλ(1) = −g
0
λ(x(0)).
The proof of proposition 9 may be found in [4].
If Λλ = Λλ(1) on an interval I, then ˙ Λλ(t) = ∂xLλ(t,xλ(t)) = 0 on I,
therefore xλ = ˜ xλ on I. Hence, from (i) and (ii), xλ is constant on the
connected components of Λλ > Λλ(1), x0 − xλ is constant on the connected
components of Λλ < Λλ(1), xλ = ˜ xλ on the connected components of Λλ =
Λλ(1). The previous proposition may therefore be viewed as a generalization
of Mussa-Rosen’s ironing procedure. It implies that [0,1] can be partitioned
into
• sub-intervals on which the quantile of the ﬁrst agent’s consumption
quantile xλ is constant. Agent 2 bears the risk.
• sub-intervals on which the quantile of the second agent’s consumption
x0 − xλ is constant. Agent 1 bears the risk.
15• sub-intervals on which xλ and x0 − xλ are increasing and xλ coincides
with ˜ xλ.
The transversality condition (iii) is useful when for instance agent 2 is
averse to the worse event (g0
2 > 0) while agent 1 is not (g1 = 0). In this case
g0
λ(x) = −(1 − λ)g0
2(x0(0) − x) < 0 hence condition (iii) yields Λλ(1) > 0.
Since Λλ(0) = 0 and Λλ is continuous, we deduce from (ii) that x0 − xλ is
constant for low values of t. In other words, agent 1 insures agent 2 for low
values of aggregate risk.
4.2 Direct applications
We now apply proposition 9 to the case where ˜ xλ or x0 − ˜ xλ is monotone.
Proposition 10 Assume g1 = g2 = 0. Then
1. If ˜ xλ ∈ A, then xλ = ˜ xλ for all t ∈ [0,1],
2. If ˜ xλ is decreasing, then xλ is constant,
3. If x0 − ˜ xλ is decreasing, then x0 − xλ is constant.
Hence, if ˜ xλ ∈ A, it is the optimal solution to the constrained problem. If ˜ xλ
(respectively x0 − ˜ xλ) is decreasing, the ﬁrst (respectively the second) agent
gets full insurance.
Agents’ aversions to the worse events are taken into account in the next
statement.
Proposition 11 Assume (11) for i = 1,2.
1. If ˜ xλ ∈ A and g0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) > 0, then xλ(t) = a, 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) =
˜ xλ(t) for t ≥ t0 for a such that ˜ xλ(0) < a < x0(0).
2. If ˜ xλ ∈ A and g0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) < 0, then xλ(t) = x0(t) − a, 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 and
xλ(t) = ˜ xλ for t ≥ t0 for some a such that x0(0) − ˜ xλ(0) < a < x0(0).
3. If ˜ xλ is decreasing, then either xλ is constant or xλ(t) = x0(t)−a, 0 ≤
t ≤ t0 < 1 and xλ(t) = b for t ≥ t0.
4. If x0 − ˜ xλ is decreasing, then either xλ(t) = x0(t) − a or xλ(t) = b for
t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) = x0(t) − a for t ≥ t0.
16To understand the meaning of the ﬁrst two assertions, assume that agent 1
is averse to the worse event (g0
1 > 0) while agent 2 is not (g2 = 0) and that
˜ xλ ∈ A. Then either agent 1 gets full insurance or she gets full insurance for
low values of aggregate risk. She thus avoids consumptions that are below
some endogeneously determined value. If ˜ xλ is decreasing, then either the
ﬁrst agent is fully insured or she is fully insured for high values of aggregate
risk.
5 Risk-sharing between two RDU
In this section, we focus on the RDU case. Agents have utility indices U1, U2
and distortions f1, f2. In the regimes where both consumptions are strictly
monotone, risk-sharing rules are those of EU maximizers with utility index
Ui and heterogeneous beliefs with densities f0
i(1 − FX0(X0)).
5.1 The case of the same distortion
As a benchmark, let us ﬁrst discuss risk-sharing rules and equilibria between
two (epsilon contaminated) RDU agents with same distortion f and utility
index Ui, i = 1,2:
vi(x) = (1 − εi)
Z 1
0
Ui(x(t))f
0(1 − t)dt + εiUi(x(0)), i = 1,2
with : lim
x→0+ U
0
i(x) = +∞, i = 1,2. (16)
The uncontaminated case is obtained for εi = 0, i = 1,2. From proposition 5,
the optimal sharing rule associated to λ is (xλ(FX0(X0)),X0 −xλ(FX0(X0)))
where xλ solves:
sup
Z 1
0
Lλ(t,x(t))dt + gλ(x(0)), x ∈ A

,
with Lλ(t,x) = [(1 − ε1)λU1(x) + (1 − λ)(1 − ε2)U2(x0(t) − x)]f
0(1 − t),
gλ(x) = λε1U1(x) + (1 − λ)ε2U2(x0(0) − x).
From (16), ˜ xλ is interior and fulﬁlls
(1 − ε1)λU
0
1(˜ xλ) − (1 − λ)(1 − ε2)U
0
2(x0 − ˜ xλ) = 0, (17)
hence (17) is independent of f and also characterizes risk-sharing rules when
agents are EU with same probability and utility index (1 − εi)Ui, i = 1,2.
17From standard risk-sharing arguments, ˜ xλ ∈ A. Using (17), we obtain
g
0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) = λU
0
1(˜ xλ(0))
ε1 − ε2
1 − ε2
. (18)
If ε1 = ε2 = 0, from proposition 10 assertion 1, xλ = ˜ xλ. Thus risk-sharing
rules between RDU agents are independent of f. Equilibrium weights are
the solutions of the following equation:
Z 1
0
f
0(1 − t)U
0
1(xλ(t))xλ(t)dt =
Z 1
0
f
0(1 − t)U
0
1(xλ(t))φ1(t)dt (19)
hence equilibria depend on f. Furthermore, (19) is the equation charac-
terizing equilibrium weights of EU with same probability having density
f0(1 − FX0(X0)) with respect to P and utility index Ui, i = 1,2.
Let us now turn to the case, ε1 6= ε2. From (18), g0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) > 0 (resp
<) iﬀ ε1 > ε2 (resp ε1 < ε2). Applying proposition 11, if ε1 > ε2, then
xλ(t) = a, 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 for some a and t0 and xλ(t) = ˜ xλ(t) for t ≥ t0 while
if ε1 < ε2, xλ(t) = x0(t) − a, 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 for some a and t0 xλ(t) = ˜ xλ(t) for
t ≥ t0. Note that, while ˜ xλ is independent of f, xλ depends on f since the
constant a and the level of the risk x0(t0) up to which the agent with highest
contamination is fully insured depend on f. Indeed, assuming ε1 > ε2, t0 < 1,
a and t0 are determined by the following sytem:
Z t0
0
(λ(1 − ε1)U
0
1(a) − (1 − λ)(1 − ε2)U
0
2(x0(u) − a))f
0(1 − u)du = −g
0
λ(a)
(20)
λ(1 − ε1)U
0
1(a) − (1 − λ)(1 − ε2)U
0
2(x0(t0) − a) = 0 (21)
(20) expresses that Λλ(t) =
R t
0 ∂xLλ(u,a)du for t ≤ t0 and Λλ(t) = Λλ(t0)
for t ≥ t0 veriﬁes Λλ(t0) = Λλ(1) = −g0
λ(a) and (21) that ˜ xλ(t0) = a or
equivalently that ∂xLλ(t0,a) = 0.
Let us summarize the previous results in a proposition.
Proposition 12 Consider two (epsilon contaminated) RDU agents with same
distortion f. If ε1 = ε2 = 0, risk-sharing rules and equilibria are those of
EU maximizers with utility index Ui, i = 1,2 and same probability with den-
sity f0(1 − FX0(X0)) with respect to P. If ε1 > ε2, then either the ﬁrst
agent is fully insured or she is fully insured up to some value of the risk
and shares risk above that value as if agents were EU maximizers with utility
index (1 − εi)Ui, i = 1,2.
185.2 The case of two diﬀerent continuous distortions
We now introduce some heterogeneity in beliefs and consider risk-sharing
rules and equilibria between two RDU agents with utility index Ui, i = 1,2
and continuous distortions fi, i = 1,2. We assume that U0
i i = 1,2 fulﬁlls
(16) for i = 1,2. The RDU risk-sharing problem with utility weight λ > 0
corresponds to the case
Lλ(t,x) = λf
0
1(1 − t)U1(x) + (1 − λ)f
0
2(1 − t)U2(x).
From proposition 5, the optimal sharing rule is (xλ(FX0(X0)),X0−xλ(FX0(X0)))
where xλ solves:
sup
x∈A
vλ(x) :=
Z 1
0
(λf
0
1(1−t)U1(x(t))+(1−λ)f
0
2(1−t)U2(x0(t)−x(t)))dt. (22)
The function ˜ xλ that maximizes pointwise the integrand in (22) is deﬁned by
λf
0
1(1 − t)U
0
1(˜ xλ(t)) = (1 − λ)f
0
2(1 − t)U
0
2(x0(t) − ˜ xλ(t)). (23)
It follows from the optimality conditions that whenever xλ and x0 − xλ are
strictly monotone on some interval, then xλ = ˜ xλ on that interval. In other
words, whenever ˜ x / ∈ A, one of the monotonicity constraints is binding some-
where: there is a range of values of the risk on which one agent is fully insured
by the other. Thus, we next discuss whether ˜ xλ belongs to A.
Diﬀerentiating (23) (assuming that all the data are smooth) yields that
˜ x0
λ(t) has the same sign as the quantity:
−
U
00
2(x0(t) − ˜ xλ(t))
U
0
2(x0(t) − ˜ xλ(t))
x
0
0(t) +

f
00
2 (1 − t)
f0
2(1 − t)
−
f
00
1 (1 − t)
f0
1(1 − t)

.
Similarly (x0 − ˜ xλ)0(t) has the sign of:
−
U
00
1(˜ xλ(t))
U
0
1(˜ xλ(t))
x
0
0(t) +

f
00
1 (1 − t)
f0
1(1 − t)
−
f
00
2 (1 − t)
f0
2(1 − t)

.
Deﬁning:
Af1,f2,U2,λ(t) =

f
00
1 (1 − t)
f0
1(1 − t)
−
f
00
2 (1 − t)
f0
2(1 − t)

−
U0
2(x0(t) − ˜ xλ(t))
U
00
2(x0(t) − ˜ xλ(t))

Bf2,f1,U1,λ(t) =

f
00
2 (1 − t)
f0
2(1 − t)
−
f
00
1 (1 − t)
f0
1(1 − t)

−
U0
1(˜ xλ(t))
U
00
1(˜ xλ(t))

.
19We therefore have ˜ xλ ∈ A iﬀ
x
0
0(t) ≥ max{Af1,f2,U2,λ(t),Bf2,f1,U1,λ(t)}, ∀t ∈ [0,1]. (24)
Condition (24) depends (in a complicated way) on the distribution of
aggregate endowment, on the tolerances to risk of both agents, on the diﬀer-
ences of their index of distortion and ﬁnally on utility weights. When agents
have same beliefs (f1 = f2), then (24) is satisﬁed for any λ as in the previous
paragraph. If inf x0
0 > 0 and if beliefs are similar (i.e. f1 − f2 is suﬃciently
small in the C2 norm so that
f”2
f0
2 '
f”1
f0
1 ) then by continuous dependence of
˜ x on (f1,f2), we deduce that (24) is still satisﬁed for similar distortions. On
the contrary, if agent one distorts probabilities much more than agent 2 and
furthermore agent 2 has high tolerance to risk, then the condition
x
0
0(t) < Af1,f2,U2,λ(t), ∀t ∈ [0,1] (25)
is likely to be satisﬁed. From proposition 10 assertion 2, agent 1 is then fully
insured. A symmetric condition may of course be given for agent 2.
Proposition 13 1. If (24) is fulﬁlled (in particular if there is weak het-
erogeneity of beliefs), then xλ = ˜ xλ. Agents thus behave as if they
were expected utility maximizers with probabilities with densities f0
i(1−
FX0(X0)) and index Ui, i = 1,2.
2. If (25) is fulﬁlled (in particular if there is high heterogeneity of beliefs
with high distortion from agent 1), then agent 1 is fully insured.
Example
Let us consider the case of CARA utilities and exponential distortions
Ui(x) = −
e−ρix
ρi
,fi(t) =
eαit − 1
eαi − 1
, i = 1,2
with α2 > α1 > 0. We recall that in the expected utility model with CARA
utilities, risk-sharing rules are piecewise linear, the interior pieces of the ﬁrst
agent having constant slope
ρ2
ρ1+ρ2.
Assuming that ˜ xλ is interior (which is not always the case since CARA util-
ities do not satisfy the Inada conditions), we obtain:
˜ xλ(t) =
1
ρ1 + ρ2
(ρ2x0(t) + (α2 − α1)t + const).
Since α2 > α1, ˜ xλ is nondecreasing, while x0 − ˜ xλ is nondecreasing iﬀ
x
0
0 ≥ (α2 − α1)/ρ1.
20This is in particularly true if α2 is close to α1 (case of weak heterogeneity of
beliefs) or if ρ1 is large. In that case,
X
∗
λ =
1
ρ1 + ρ2
(ρ2X0 + (α2 − α1)FX0(X0) + const). (26)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the standard risk-sharing rule between two
EU agents with CARA utilities. The second term is due to the uncertainty
eﬀect. If α2 > α1 (i.e. agent 2 is more uncertainty averse than agent 1),
then, in addition to the standard linear risk-sharing rule, X∗
λ includes a term
which is comonotone with X0. In other words, agent 1 is more exposed to
the variations of the aggregate risk X0 than in the EU case and partially
insures agent 2, by taking the additional risk (α2 − α1)FX0(X0)/(ρ1 + ρ2).
Furthermore, (26) can be interpreted as a three-fund result: at equilibrium,
at most three assets are traded: the risk-free asset and assets with payoﬀ X0
and FX0(X0). A two-fund result is obtained if X0 is uniformly distributed.
Let ρ and α be respectively the aggregate risk aversion and the aggregate
distortion indices deﬁned by 1
ρ = 1
ρ1 + 1
ρ2 and α
ρ =
α1
ρ1 +
α2
ρ2. The pricing
density supporting an interior eﬃcient allocation (or an interior equilibrium)
being proportional to the marginal utility of any agent with strictly increasing
sharing rule, it is proportional to
e
−ρ1X∗
λ+α1FX0(X0) = e
−ρX0−αFX0(X0).
In other words, at equilibrium, there is an RDU representative agent with
constant risk tolerance ρ and power distortion with exponent α. It can be
shown in this case that the risk premium is increasing in ρ and α.
If x0
0(t) < (α2 − α1)/ρ1, for all t ∈ [0,1], then the consumption of
agent 2 is constant. This is true in the case where α2 − α1 is large (case of
heterogeneous agents) or if the tolerance to risk of the ﬁrst agent is high.
As the previous example and the next section show, (24) is not in general
fulﬁlled on [0,1]. When (24) is violated on some interval I, there are ranges of
values of aggregate endowment containing x0(I) for which the consumption
of one of the two agents is constant. This is the case when one of the agent
distorts much more than the other small or large probabilities.
Proposition 14 1. If f0
1(0) = 0 and f0
2(0) 6= 0 (resp f0
2(0) = 0 and
f0
1(0) 6= 0), then for any λ, the ﬁrst (second) agent is fully insured for
high values of aggregate endowment.
212. If f0
1(1) = ∞ and f0
1(1) < ∞(f0
2(1) = ∞ and f0
1(1) < ∞), then for any
λ, the ﬁrst (second) agent is fully insured for low values of aggregate
endowment.
Proof. Let us assume that f0
1(0) = 0 and f0
2(0) 6= 0. From proposition 9,
one has:
Λλ(t) =
Z 1
t
((1 − λ)f
0
2(1 − s)U
0
2(x0(s) − xλ(s)) − λf
0
1(1 − s)U
0
1(xλ(s)))ds
therefore Λλ decreases for t close to 1 and Λλ(t) > 0. Hence xλ is constant
for t close to 1. Thus, the consumption of the ﬁrst agent is constant for high
values of aggregate endowment. If f0
1(1) = ∞ and f0
2(1) < ∞, one obtains in
a similar way that Λλ(t) > 0 for small t : the consumption of the ﬁrst agent
is constant for low values of aggregate endowment.
5.3 The case of discontinuous distortions
We now consider risk-sharing between two epsilon contaminated RDU agents
with discontinuous distortions fi, contaminations εi and utility index Ui ful-
ﬁlling (16) for i = 1,2. From proposition 5, the optimal sharing rule associ-
ated to λ solves:
sup
Z 1
0
Lλ(t,x(t))dt + gλ(x(0)), x ∈ A

,
with Lλ(t,x) = (1−ε1)λU1(x)f
0
1(1−t)+(1−λ)(1−ε2)U2(x0(t)−x)f
0
2(1−t)
gλ(x) = λε1U1(x) + (1 − λ)ε2U2(x0(0) − x)
Let ˜ xλ be deﬁned by
λ(1−ε1)f
0
1(1−t)U
0
1(˜ xλ(t))−(1−λ)(1−ε2)f
0
2(1−t)U
0
2(x0(t)−˜ xλ(t)) = 0. (27)
As a consequence of proposition 11, one obtains:
Proposition 15 1. If ˜ xλ fulﬁlls (24) (in particular if there is weak het-
erogeneity of beliefs) and if ε2  1, then either the ﬁrst agent is fully
insured or she is fully insured up to some value of the risk. Above that
value, agents behave as if they were expected utility maximizers with
probabilities with densities f0
i(1−FX0(X0)) and index (1−εi)Ui, i = 1,2.
222. If ˜ xλ fulﬁlls (25) (in particular if there is high heterogeneity of beliefs,
agent 1 is either fully insured or fully insured for high values of aggre-
gate risk.
As the next section shows, condition (24) or (25) may not be fulﬁlled.
We therefore make below less stringent assumptions.
Proposition 16 1. If f0
1(0) = 0 and f0
2(0) 6= 0, then for any utility
weights, the ﬁrst agent is fully insured for high values of aggregate en-
dowment.
2. If ε2 = 0 and ε1 > 0, then for any utility weights, the ﬁrst agent is
insured for low values of aggregate endowment.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst assertion is as in proposition 14. To prove
the second, let ε2 = 0 and ε1 > 0, then
g
0
λ(x) = λε1U
0
1(x), for all x.
Therefore Λλ(1) < 0 = Λλ(0). By the optimality conditions, xλ is constant
for low values of t and the ﬁrst agent is fully insured for low values of aggre-
gate endowment.
Propositions 14 and 16 provide foundations for insurance contracts with
deductibles and upper limits.
6 Risk-sharing and equilibria: examples
The aim of this ﬁnal section is to obtain closed-form solutions for some exam-
ples. In subsection 6.1, we solve the risk-sharing and equilibrium problems
in the case of two agents with the same logarithmic RLU. In subsection 6.2,
we consider the class of RDU’s with logarithmic utility and power distor-
tions. We study risk-sharing and equilibria both in the uncontaminated and
contaminated cases.
6.1 Risk-sharing and equilibria between symmetric
agents with RLU utilities
We ﬁrst provide an example of risk-sharing between two symmetric agents
with utility function VL(X) =
R 1
0 ln(F
−1
X (t) + t)dt. We further assume that
aggregate endowment is uniformly distributed on [1,2] (hence x0(t) = t + 1
23and FX0(X0) = X0 − 1). The optimal sharing rule is (xλ(X0 − 1),X0 −
xλ(X0 − 1)) where xλ solves:
sup
Z 1
0
λln(x(t) + t)dt + (1 − λ)
Z 1
0
ln(t + x0(t) − x(t))dt, x ∈ A

.
The next result is proven in the appendix.
Proposition 17 1. If 1
3 ≤ λ ≤ 2
3, then xλ(t) = (3λ − 1)x0(t) + 1 − λ.
2. If λ > 2
3, then xλ(t) = a + t with λ ≤ a ≤ 1. Agent 1 insures agent 2.
3. If λ < 1
3, then xλ(t) = a with 0 ≤ a ≤ λ. Agent 2 insures agent 1.
If 1
3 ≤ λ ≤ 2
3, then both agents hold a share of aggregate risk and of the
riskless asset. For other values of λ, one of the agent is fully insured. We
thus obtain a two-funds result.
In assertion 2 (resp. 3), a is determined as a function of λ by solving the
equation
R 1
0 ∂xLλ(t,a + t)dt = 0 (resp.
R 1
0 ∂xLλ(t,a)dt = 0).
We end this subsection by computing the equilibria when the ﬁrst agent
has a share 0 < k < 1 of X0. As a benchmark, we recall that, in the EU case
with logarithmic utilities, the equilibrium weight is λ∗ = k. Hence for any k,
there is a unique no-transaction equilibrium.
Since xλ (respectively x0 − ˜ xλ) is continuous and strictly increasing for
λ > 1
3 (respectively λ ≤ 1
3), from proposition 8, the price supporting an
eﬃcient allocation is proportional to the marginal utility of the ﬁrst (respec-
tively second) agent. The properties of equilibrium are summarized in the
next proposition (see appendix for proofs):
Proposition 18 Equilibrium is unique. If k ≥ 3+2ln2
3+4ln2, then agent 1 insures
agent 2. If 2ln2
3+4ln2 ≤ k ≤ 3+2ln2
3+4ln2, then both agents hold a share of aggregate
risk and of the riskless asset. If k ≤ 2ln2
3+4ln2, then agent 1 insures agent 2.
6.2 An example of risk-sharing rules and equilibria be-
tween two RDU agents
We now consider risk-sharing rules and equilibria between two RDU agents
with utility index U(x) = ln(x) and distortions f1(t) = tα, α ≥ 1 f2(t) =
(1 − ε)tβ, t < 1, β > α. The ﬁrst agent is thus less uncertainty averse than
the second who furthermore displays aversion to the worse state. The risk-
sharing problem thus depends on four parameters (α,β,ε,λ). Risk-sharing
24between an expected utility maximizer agent and a RDU agent is obtained
for α = 1, ε = 0. We shall ﬁrst describe risk-sharing rules for ε = 0 and
ﬁxed (α,β). We then study the eﬀect of introducing ε. We again assume
that aggregate endowment X0 is uniformly distributed on [1,2].
As a benchmark, we recall that, if the ﬁrst agent is a risk neutral EU and
the second a strictly SSD preserving Yaari utility or a RDU, then eﬃcient
contracts are pairs of the form ((X0 − d)+,min(X0,d)) (the ﬁrst agent gets
a call option on X0). In the RDU model we consider, the more risk-averse
agent is fully insured by the other for high values of X0.
6.2.1 Risk-sharing rules without epsilon-contamination
We ﬁrst consider risk-sharing rules when ε = 0. From proposition 5, the
optimal sharing rule associated to λ is (xλ(X0 − 1),X0 − xλ(X0 − 1)) where
xλ solves:
sup
Z 1
0
Lλ(t,x(t))dt, x ∈ A

,
with Lλ(t,x) = λα(1 − t)α−1 ln(x) + (1 − λ)β(1 − t)β−1 ln(t + 1 − x).
Let ˜ xλ satisfy ∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0 for all t. We have
˜ xλ(t) =
t + 1
1 +
(1−λ)β
λα (1 − t)β−α (28)
According to the values of α,β,λ, either ˙ ˜ xλ(t) ≤ 1 for t ≤ t1 for some t1
or ˙ ˜ xλ(t) > 1 for all t. Hence it is never the case that xλ(t) = ˜ xλ(t) for all
t ∈ [0,1]. Risk-sharing rules are described in the next proposition.
Proposition 19 For every (α,β), there exists λ1 such that
1. If λ ≤ λ1, then for some t0, xλ = ˜ xλ for t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) = t−t0+˜ xλ(t0)
for t ≥ t0.
2. If λ ≥ λ1, then xλ(t) = a + t for some 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
Hence if the weight of the less uncertainty averse agent is large enough, she
plays the role of an insurer and provides the other agent with full insurance.
If λ is small enough, below some threshold value for X0, agents behave as
if they were expected utility maximizers with heterogeneous beliefs given by
densities α(1−FX0(X0))α−1 and β(1−FX0(X0))β−1 and logarithmic utilities.
Above that threshold, the ﬁrst agent provides full insurance to the second.
Hence, in this example, high values of the risk are always fully insured by
the less uncertainty averse agent.
25The next ﬁgure represents the solution for parameters λ = 0.5, α = 1 and
β = 3. One numerically ﬁnds t1 ≈ 0.477, t0 ≈ 0.301 in that case.
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6.2.2 Equilibria in the uncontaminated case
We now compute the equilibria of the economy of the previous subsection as-
suming that the ﬁrst agent has a share 0 < k < 1 of X0. As a benchmark, we
recall that, in the EU case with logarithmic utilities, the equilibrium weight
is λ∗ = k. Hence for any k, there is a unique no-transaction equilibrium.
Since from proposition 19, xλ is continuous and strictly increasing for all
λ, the price is proportional to the marginal utility of the ﬁrst agent. From
proposition 8, an equilibrium weight is characterized by
Z 1
0
α(1 − t)α−1
xλ(t)
(xλ(t) − k(t + 1))dt = 0
which yields
1
k
Z 1
0
α(1 − t)
α−1dt =
1
k
=
Z 1
0
α(t + 1)(1 − t)α−1
xλ(t)
dt. (29)
The properties of equilibrium are summarized in the next proposition (see
appendix for proofs):
Proposition 20 1. Equilibrium is unique and the equilibrium utility weight
λ∗ veriﬁes λ∗ = k.
262. If k ≥ λ1 with λ1 as in proposition 19, then agent 1 insures the other
agent. Her equilibrium consumption is a + X0 − 1 for some 0 < a < 1
independent of β.
3. If k ≤ λ1, then agents agents behave as if they were expected utility
maximizers with densities α(1 − FX0(X0))α−1 and β(1 − FX0(X0))β−1
up to some endogeneously determined value of aggregate risk. Above
that value, Agent 1 insures agent 2.
In the RDU case, contrary to the EU case where the equilibrium utility
weight λ∗ veriﬁes λ∗ = k and there is no trade at equilibrium, there is trade
at equilibrium.
6.2.3 The case of epsilon-contamination
We now assume that the second agent has an epsilon-contaminated RDU
utility u2(x) = (1 − ε)β
R 1
0 ln(x(t))(1 − t)β−1dt + εln(x(0)) while u1(x) =
α
R 1
0 ln(x(t))(1 − t)α−1dt, β > α. From proposition 5, the optimal sharing
rule associated to λ is (xλ(X0 − 1),X0 − xλ(X0 − 1)) where xλ solves:
sup
x∈A
Z 1
0
Lλ(t,x(t))dt + gλ(x(0)),
with Lλ(t,x) = αλ(1 − t)α−1 ln(x) + (1 − λ)(1 − ε)β(1 − t)β−1 ln(t + 1 − x)
gλ(x) = (1 − λ)εln(1 − x).
Let ˜ xλ satisfy ∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0 for all t. We have
˜ xλ(t) =
t + 1
1 +
β(1−ε)(1−λ)
λα (1 − t)β−α. (30)
From (iii) of proposition 9,
Λλ(1) = −g
0
λ(xλ(0)) =
(1 − λ)(1 − ε)
1 − xλ(0)
> 0. (31)
Since Λλ(1) > Λλ(0) = 0, from (ii) of proposition 9, xλ(t) = t + x0 in a
neighborhood of 0. Then according to the values of the parameters (α,β,ε,λ)
only two cases are possible: either xλ(t) = t + x0 for all t in which case
Λλ(1) > Λλ(t) for all t or there exists (t0,t1) with 0 < t0 < t1 < 1 such that
xλ(t) = t + x0 for t ≤ t0, xλ = ˜ xλ for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 and xλ(t) = t − t1 + ˜ xλ(t1)
for t ≥ t1. In this later case, Λλ increases on [0,t0], Λλ(t) = Λλ(1) on [t0,t1]
27and Λλ(1) > Λλ(t) on ]t1,1[.
Symmetrically either the second agent is fully insured for all values of the
risk or her consumption is constant for low values of the risk and for high
values of the risk. In other words, the second agent insures herself a minimal
amount and reaches satiation for high values of the risk.
When the ﬁrst agent has a share 0 < k < 1 of X0, as in the uncontami-
nated case, we obtain:
Proposition 21 Equilibrium is unique and the equilibrium utility weight λ∗
veriﬁes λ∗ = k.
7 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
Let us show that 1 implies 2. Let us ﬁrst prove that ∂xL ≥ 0 on [0,1] × R.
Let x1 < x2 < x3 and pi > 0, i = 1,..,3 be such that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
Let Y be a random taking values xi with probability pi. Let ε > 0 and
δ > 0 be small and X be a random variable such that P(X = x1) = p1,
P(X = x2) = p2−δ, P(X = x2+ε) = δ, and P(X = x3) = p3. It may easily
be veriﬁed that X 2 Y . Hence we obtain
Z p1+p2
p1+p2−δ
[L(t,x2 + ε) − L(t,x2)]dt ≥ 0. (32)
Dividing by δ and letting δ → 0+, we have that for every ε small enough
L(p1 + p2,x2 + ε) ≥ L(p1 + p2,x2)
whuch proves the claim of monotonicity.
Let x1 < x2 < x3 be such that x3 − x2 = x2 − x1 and 0 < b < a < 1.
Let X et Y be two random variables such that P(X = x1) = 1−a, P(X =
x2) = a − b, P(X = x3) = b and P(Y = x1) = 1 − (a+b
2 ) := p1 and
P(Y = x3) = a+b
2 . E(X) = E(Y ) and one easily veriﬁes that for every
u : R → R concave, E(u(X)) ≥ E(u(Y )), hence X 2 Y . Since VL is S.S.D.
preserving, we have
Z 1−a
0
L(t,x1)dt +
Z 1−b
1−a
L(t,
x1 + x3
2
)dt +
Z 1
1−b
L(t,x3)dt
≥
Z p1
0
L(t,x1)dt +
Z 1
p1
L(t,x3)dt.
28Equivalently
Z 1−( a+b
2 )
1−a
L(t,x1)dt +
Z 1−b
1−( a+b
2 )
L(t,x3)dt ≤
Z 1−b
1−a
L(t,
x1 + x3
2
)dt. (33)
Dividing by a − b and letting b → a+, one obtains that for every 0 < a < 1
and x1 < x3,
1
2
[L(1 − a,x1) + L(1 − a,x3)] ≤ L(1 − a,
x1 + x3
2
).
Hence L(t,.) is concave for every t ∈ [0,1].
It remains to show that ∂txL ≤ 0 on [0,1] × R. Let x1 < x2 < x3 and
ε > 0 be such that x1 + ε < x2 < x3 − ε. Let X and Y be two random
variables such that P(Y = x1) = p1, P(Y = x2) = p2, P(Y = x3) = p3
and P(X = x1) = p1 − u, P(X = x1 + ε) = u, P(X = x2) = p2, P(X =
x3 − ε) = u, P(X = x3) = p3 − u with u ≤ min{p1,p3}. It may easily be
veriﬁed that E(X) = E(Y ) and that X 2 Y . Hence we obtain
Z p1
p1−u
[L(t,x1 + ε) − L(t,x1)] +
Z p1+p2+u
p1+p2
[L(t,x3 − ε) − L(t,x3)] ≥ 0 (34)
Dividing by u and letting u → 0+, we have that for every ε small enough
L(p1,x1 + ε) − L(p1,x1) + L(p1 + p2,x3 − ε) − L(p1 + p2,x3) ≥ 0.
Dividing by ε and letting ε → 0+, we obtain that
∂xL(p1,x1) ≥ ∂xL(p1 + p2,x3), for all(p1,p2) and x1 < x3
As x3 → x1, one gets that ∂xL(.,x) is nonincreasing for every x as was to be
proven.
Let us show that 2 implies 3. Since ∂txL ≤ 0, a submodular version of
Hardy-Littlewood’s inequality (see [1]) yields:
Z 1
0
L(t,F
−1
X (t))dt ≤ inf
U uniform
E(L(U,X)).
Furthermore since (Ω,B,P) is non-atomic, for every random variable X,
there exists UX uniformly distributed such that X = F
−1
X (UX) P-a.e. Hence R 1
0 L(t,F
−1
X (t))dt = E(L(UX,X)) and
VL(X) = inf
U uniform
E(L(U,X)). (35)
29Since for every U, E(L(U,.)) is concave and σ(L∞,L1) upper-semi-continuous,
it follows from (35) that VL is concave and σ(L∞,L1) upper-semi-continuous
which proves assertion 3.
Finally, the fact that 3 implies 1 follows from proposition 1. If, in addition
to the assumptions of the previous proposition, we either assume that L(t,.)
is strictly concave for every t ∈ [0,1], or that ∂txL < 0 then VL is strictly
S.S.D. preserving. Indeed, assume ﬁrst that L(t,.) is strictly concave and let
X and Y be in L∞(Ω,B,P) with X 2 Y . By strict concavity and since
F
−1
X 6= F
−1
Y , we have:
VL(Y ) − VL(X) <
Z 1
0
∂xL(t,F
−1
X (t))(F
−1
Y (t) − F
−1
X (t))dt.
Let g(t) := ∂xL(t,F
−1
X (t)). By assumption, g is nonnegative. Since F
−1
X can
be approximated by smooth nondecreasing functions in the a.e. convergence,
we may assume that F
−1
X := x is a smooth nondecreasing function. Hence
d
dt
[∂xL(t,x(t))] = ∂txL(t,x(t)) + ∂xxL(t,x(t))˙ x(t) ≤ 0,
and g is nonincreasing. From (3), we deduce that VL(Y ) < VL(X), hence
VL is strictly S.S.D. preserving. Finally, if ∂txL < 0, then g deﬁned above is
decreasing, hence if X 2 Y , then
VL(Y ) − VL(X) ≤
Z 1
0
g(t)(F
−1
Y (t) − F
−1
X (t))dt < 0.
Proof of proposition 3
It follows from V0 being monotone and translation invariant that ∂V0(X) ⊂ S.
Moreover if µ ∈ S satisﬁes hµ,Xi = essinfX, it is immediate to check that
µ ∈ ∂V0(X). Conversely if µ ∈ ∂V0(X), then taking Y = 2X and Y = X/2
in the inequality V0(Y ) − V0(X) ≤ hµ,Y − Xi yields hµ,Xi = essinfX. The
identity ∂V0(X) = ∂V0(g(X)) follows from the strict monotonicity of g (in
fact, it is not so straightforward to prove it, one has to approximate elements
of ∂V0(X) by L1(P) probability densities, we omit the details here). Assume
that η = µg0(X) with µ ∈ ∂V0(X) = ∂V0(g(X)) and let Y ∈ L∞, then by
concavity of g and monotonicity of V0, one has:
V (Y ) − V (X) = V0(g(Y )) − V0(g(X)) ≤ V0(g(X) + g
0(X)(Y − X)) − V0(g(X))
≤ hµ,g
0(X)(Y − X)i = hη,Y − Xi
30so that η ∈ ∂V (X). Conversely, let η ∈ ∂V (X), then for all ε > 0 and
Z ∈ L∞, using the superlinearity of V , we get:
εV0(g
0(X)Z) ≤ V0(g(X) + εg
0(X)Z) − V0(g(X))
= V0(g(X + εZ) − V0(g(X)) + o(ε) ≤ εhη,Zi + o(ε).
This implies that η = µg0(X) with µ ∈ S. Taking Z = g(X)/g0(X) and
Z = −g(X)/g0(X) in the inequality
lim0+ε
−1(V0(g(X) + εg
0(X)Z) − V0(g(X)) ≤ hη,Zi = hµ,g
0(X)Zi
then yields hµ,g(X)i = V0(g(X)) so that µ ∈ ∂V0(g(X)) = ∂V0(X).
Proof of proposition 6
Assume that (X∗,X0 − X∗,Ψ∗) is an interior equilibrium with transfer pay-
ments. Then there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such that (up to a multiplicative constant)
Ψ∗ ∈ λ∂V1(X∗) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2(X0 − X∗), which implies that X∗ solves (Pλ).
Deﬁning the uniformly distributed variable U0 := FX0(X0), we then have
by proposition 5, (X∗,X0 − X∗) = (xλ(U0),(x0 − xλ)(U0)) where xλ is the
solution of ( ˜ Pλ). We claim that λ∂V1(X∗)∩(1−λ)∂V2(X0 −X∗) consists of
a single element of the form Ψ = pλ(U0) which will imply Ψ∗ = pλ(U0). Let
Ψ ∈ λ∂V1(X∗) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2(X0 − X∗). Proposition 1, implies that Ψ ∈ L1
+
and that Ψ is anticomonotone to xλ(FX0(X0)) and to (x0 − xλ)(FX0(X0)).
Since x0 is strictly increasing, Ψ is then anticomonotone to U0. Let
ΩX∗ = {ω : P(X
∗ = X
∗(ω)) > 0} = U
−1
0 (bunch(xλ))
denote the set of atoms of X∗ and let us deﬁne ΩX0−X∗ in a similar way. Since
x0 is strictly increasing, P(Ωc
X∗ ∪ Ωc
X0−X∗) = 1. Moreover from theorem 1
assertion 3, for any ω ∈ Ωc
X∗, we have
Ψ(ω) = λ∂xL1(FX∗(X
∗(ω)),X
∗(ω)) = λ∂xL1(U0(ω),xλ(U0(ω))).
Since ∂xxL1 ≤ 0 and ∂txL1 < 0, Ψ is a decreasing function of U0 on Ωc
X∗ and
by a similar argument on Ωc
X0−X∗. Since Ψ is anticomonotone to U0, Ψ is
thus a nonincreasing function pλ of U0 deﬁned by
pλ(t) =

λ∂xL1(t,xλ(t)) on (bunch(xλ))c
(1 − λ)∂xL2(t,(x0 − xλ)(t)) on bunch(xλ)
This proves that λ∂V1(X∗) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2(X0 − X∗) = {pλ(U0)}.
Conversely, let (X∗,X0 − X∗,Ψ∗) = (xλ(U0),(x0 − xλ)(U0),pλ(U0)) for
some λ ∈ (0,1). Then (X∗,X0−X∗) solves (Pλ) and, as previously, λ∂V1(X∗)∩
(1 − λ)∂V2(X0 − X∗) = {pλ(U0)} = {Ψ∗}. Hence (X∗,X0 − X∗,Ψ∗) is an
interior equilibrium with transfer payments.
31Proof of proposition 7
Let us deﬁne, as previously, U0 := FX0(X0). Assume now that (X∗,X0 −
X∗,Ψ∗) is an interior equilibrium with transfer payments. Then, as in
the proof of proposition 6, there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such that (X∗,X0 −
X∗) = (xλ(U0),(x0 − xλ)(U0)) and (up to a multiplicative constant) Ψ∗ ∈
λ∂V1(X∗)∩(1−λ)∂V2(X0−X∗). Using proposition 3 and theorem 1, we ob-
tain ∂V0(X∗)∩L1 6= ∅. This implies P(X∗ = essinfX∗) > 0. Since U0 is uni-
formly distributed and X∗ = xλ(U0), we deduce that xλ is constant in a neigh-
bourhood of 0+ (equivalently X∗ is constant for low values of X0). We now
claim, that as in the proof of proposition 6, λ∂V1(X∗)∩(1−λ)∂V2(X0−X∗) =
{pλ(U0)}. Let Ψ ∈ ∂V1(X∗)∩∂V2(X0−X∗), there exists a probability Q1 that
is absolutely continuous with respect to P, such that Q1(X∗ = essinfX∗) = 1
and (Ψ1,Ψ2) ∈ ∂VL1(X∗) × ∂VL2(X0 − X∗) such that
Ψ = λ(Ψ1 + Q1g
0
1(X
∗)) = (1 − λ)Ψ2.
We have {X∗ = essinfX∗} ⊂ ΩX∗ hence Q1(Ωc
X∗) = 0. Arguing as in the
proof of proposition 6, we then have Ψ = λ∂xL1(U0,xλ(U0)) = pλ(U0) on
Ωc
X∗ and Ψ = (1 − λ)∂xL2(U0,(x0 − xλ)(U0)) = pλ(U0) on Ωc
X0−X∗. We thus
have proven that λ∂V1(X∗) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2(X0 − X∗) = {pλ(U0)}.
Conversely, the fact that for λ ∈ (0,1), (xλ(U0),(x0 − xλ)(U0),pλ(U0)) is
an interior equilibrium with transfer payments follows from
λ∂V1(xλ(U0)) ∩ (1 − λ)∂V2((x0 − xλ)(U0)) = {pλ(U0)}.
Proof of proposition 10
The proof of assertion 1. is obvious. Assertion 2. : let us assume that ˜ xλ is
decreasing. We ﬁrst claim that xλ(0) < ˜ xλ(0). If not xλ(0) ≥ ˜ xλ(0). Since
˜ xλ is decreasing, xλ(t) > ˜ xλ(t) for all t > 0 and since ∂xLλ(t,.) is strictly
decreasing ∂xLλ(t,xλ(t)) < ∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0. This implies that Λλ(t) = R t
0 ∂xLλ(u,xλ(u))du < 0 for all t contradicting the fact that Λλ(1) = 0. Hence
xλ(t) < ˜ xλ(t) for t close to 0. As ∂xLλ(t,xλ(t)) > ∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0, Λλ(t) >
0 = Λλ(1) and from proposition 10, xλ(t) = xλ(0) for t close to 0. We claim
that xλ(t) = xλ(0) with xλ(0) deﬁned by
R 1
0 ∂xLλ(u,xλ(0))du = 0 (existence
of such xλ(0) follows from (12) and the intermediate value theorem) is the
optimal solution. Indeed the function Λλ(t) =
R t
0 ∂xLλ(u,xλ(0))du is concave,
hence Λλ(t) > Λλ(1) = 0 for all t and xλ(t) = xλ(0) fulﬁlls the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions of proposition 10. The proof of assertion 3 is obtained
by permuting the two agents.
32Proof of proposition 11
Firstly, let us remark that from (11), −g0
λ(0) = −∞ and −g0
λ(x0(0)) = ∞.
Since −g0
λ is continuous and strictly increasing, there exists β such that
−g0
λ(β) = 0. Secondly, by exchanging the roles of the two agents, it is in fact
enough to prove assertions 1 and 3.
Assertion 1. Assume ﬁrst that g0
λ(˜ x(0)) > 0 or equivalently that ˜ xλ(0) <
β. We claim that xλ(0) > ˜ xλ(0). If not xλ(0) ≤ ˜ xλ(0) < β, hence −g0
λ(xλ(0)) =
Λλ(1) < 0. Since Λλ(0) = 0 > Λλ(1), from proposition 9, xλ is constant for
t close to 0. Since xλ cannot cross ˜ xλ, xλ < ˜ xλ for all t and Λλ increases.
Thus Λλ(t) > 0 for all t contradicting 0 > Λλ(1). Hence xλ(0) > ˜ xλ(0). If
xλ(0) > β, −g0
λ(xλ(0)) = Λλ(1) > 0 = Λλ(0). From proposition 9, x0 −xλ is
constant for t close to 0. Since xλ cannot cross ˜ xλ, x0 −xλ remains constant
and xλ > ˜ xλ for all t. Then Λλ(t) < 0 for all t, contradicting Λλ(1) > 0.
Hence β > xλ(0) > ˜ xλ(0) equivalently −g0
λ(x(0)) = Λλ(1) < 0 = Λλ(0).
From proposition 9, for t close to 0, xλ is constant and since xλ(t) > ˜ xλ(t),
Λλ decreases. Two cases are possible: either Λλ(t) ≥ Λλ(1) for all t, in
which case the solution is constant for all t or there exists t0 such that
xλ(t0) = ˜ xλ(t0) in which case Λλ(t) > Λλ(1) for t < t0 and Λλ(t) = Λλ(1) for
t ≥ t0. The solution equals a for t ≤ t0 and ˜ xλ for t ≥ t0.
The proof that if g0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) < 0, the solution equals x0 − a for t ≤ t0 and ˜ xλ
for t ≥ t0. is similar.
Assertion 3. Assume ﬁrst that g0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) > 0 or equivalently that
˜ xλ(0) < β. We claim that xλ(0) < β. If not xλ(0) ≥ β > ˜ xλ(0), and
−g0
λ(xλ(0)) = Λλ(1) > 0 = Λλ(0). From proposition 9, x0 − xλ is constant
in a neighborhood of zero with xλ > ˜ xλ and Λ decreases. Since ˜ xλ is de-
creasing, xλ > ˜ xλ for all t, Λλ decreases, contradicting Λλ(1) > 0. Therefore
xλ(0) < β or equivalently −g0
λ(xλ(0)) = Λλ(1) < 0 = Λλ(0). From proposi-
tion 9, xλ is constant in a neighborhood of zero. If xλ(0) < ˜ xλ(0), let Λλ(t) = R t
0 ∂xLλ(u,xλ(0))du. Then Λλ increases and decreases, Λλ(t) > Λλ(1) for all t
and xλ = xλ(0) veriﬁes the conditions of proposition 9. If ˜ xλ(0) < xλ(0) < β,
let again Λλ(t) =
R t
0 ∂xLλ(u,xλ(0))du. Since ˜ xλ is decreasing, xλ cannot
cross ˜ xλ. Hence ˜ xλ(t) < xλ(t) and Λλ decreases for all t. This implies that
Λλ(t) > Λλ(1) for all t and xλ = xλ(0) is the optimal solution.
Assume next that g0
λ(˜ xλ(0)) < 0 or equivalently that ˜ xλ(0) > β. We claim
that xλ(0) < ˜ xλ(0). If not xλ(0) > ˜ xλ(0) > β and Λλ(1) = −g0
λ(xλ(0)) > 0.
Since ˜ xλ is decreasing, xλ(t) > ˜ xλ(t) for all t and Λλ(t) < 0 for all t, a con-
tradiction. Hence xλ(0) < ˜ xλ(0). If xλ(0) < β, then Λλ(1) = −g0
λ(xλ(0)) <
0 = Λλ(0) and xλ is constant in a neighborhood of zero. Let again Λλ(t) = R t
0 ∂xLλ(u,x(0))du. Then Λλ increases and decreases, Λλ(t) > Λλ(1) for
all t and xλ = xλ(0) is the optimal solution. If β < xλ(0) < ˜ xλ(0), then
33Λλ(1) = −g0
λ(xλ(0)) > 0 = Λλ(0). xλ = x0 −a is constant in a neighborhood
of zero and Λλ increases. Then either Λλ(1) > 0 = Λλ(t) for all t, in which
case xλ = x0 − a for all t or Λλ increases and decreases with Λλ(t) > Λλ(1)
for t ∈ [t0,1] and the solution is x0 − a for t small enough and is constant
after.
Proof of proposition 17
Let Lλ(t,x) = λln(x+t)+(1−λ)ln(2t+1−x) and ˜ xλ(t) solve maxx∈R+Lλ(t,x).
• If 1
3 ≤ λ ≤ 2
3, we have ˜ xλ(t) = (3λ − 1)x0 + 1 − 2λ and ˜ xλ ∈ A. From
proposition 10 assertion 1, xλ = ˜ xλ.
• If 1 ≥ λ > 2
3, then ˜ xλ = min{(3λ − 1)x0 + 1 − 2λ,x0} and x0 − ˜ xλ is
decreasing. From proposition 10 assertion 3, xλ = a+t with λ ≤ a ≤ 1.
• Finally, if 0 ≤ λ < 1
3, then ˜ xλ = (3λ−1)x0+1−2λ and ˜ xλ is decreasing.
From proposition 10 assertion 2, xλ = a with 0 ≤ a ≤ λ.
Proof of proposition 18
Let us ﬁrst assume that 1
3 ≤ λ ≤ 2
3. Then xλ(t) = (3λ − 1)t − λ. From
proposition 8, since xλ is continuous and strictly increasing for all λ, the
price is proportional to the marginal utility of the ﬁrst agent. From the ﬁrst
order conditions, pλ(t) is proportional to 1
3t+1. The equilibrium weight is thus
the solution to Z 1
0
(3λ − 1)t − λ
3t + 1
dt = k
Z 1
0
t + 1
3t + 1
dt.
We obtain λ∗ = 1
3 − 2ln2
9 +
k(3+4ln2)
9 . λ∗ is thus uniquely determined as a
function of k and since 1
3 ≤ λ∗ ≤ 2
3, we must have 2ln2
3+4ln2 ≤ k ≤ 3+2ln2
3+4ln2.
Assume now λ > 2
3, then xλ(t) = t+a and pλ(t) is proportional to 1
2t+a. The
equilibrium weight is the solution to
Z 1
0
t + a
2t + a
dt = k
Z 1
0
t + 1
2t + a
dt.
hence a is uniquely determined in fonction of k and is an increasing function
of k. Since
R 1
0 ∂xLλ(t,a + t)dt = 0, we have
Z 1
0
λ∗
2t + a
dt −
Z 1
0
(1 − λ∗)
t + 1 − a
dt = 0.
Hence λ∗ is uniquely determined as a function of a and is an increasing
function of a, thus an increasing function of k. Since λ∗ > 2
3, we obtain
k ≥ 3+2ln2
3+4ln2. The case λ < 1
3 is obtained in a similar way.
34Proof of proposition 19
Let µ = 1−λ
λ . Clearly, ˜ xλ is increasing and one can check that there exists t1
such that ˙ ˜ xλ(t) ≤ 1 for t ≤ t1 iﬀ µ ≥ α
β(β − α − 1).
Let M : R+ → R be deﬁned by
M(µ) =
Z 1
0
 
(1 − u)α−1
(1 + µ
β
α)u + 1
!
du − 1/β (36)
and µ0 = inf{µ ≥ 0 | M(µ) ≤ 0}. Let t0 ∈]0,1[ be such that
Z 1
t0
∂xLλ(u,u − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0))du = 0. (37)
We claim that if µ ≥ max{α
β(β −α−1),µ0}, then a solution t0 to (37) exists
and xλ = ˜ xλ for t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) = t − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0) for t ≥ t0.
Indeed, assume that µ ≥ α
β(β − α − 1). To see whether a solution t0 to
(37) exists, consider
Φ(t) =:
Z 1
t
∂xLλ(u,u−t+˜ xλ(t))du =
Z 1
t
λ

α(1 − u)α−1
u − t + ˜ xλ(t)
− µβ
(1 − u)(β−1)
t − ˜ xλ(t)

du
Since ˙ Φ(t) = ( ˙ ˜ xλ(t) − 1)
R 1
t ∂xxLλ(u,u − t + ˜ xλ(t))du, ˙ Φ(t) ≥ 0 iﬀ ˙ ˜ xλ(t) ≤ 1,
hence iﬀ t ≤ t1. As µ ≥ α
β(β−α−1) such a t1 exists. Since Φ(1) = 0, Φ(t) > 0
for t ≥ t1. As Φ is continuous, from the intermediate value theorem, there
exists t0 such that Φ(t0) = 0 iﬀ
Φ(0) =
Z 1
0
λ

α
(1 − u)α−1
(u + ˜ xλ(0)
−
µ
1 − ˜ xλ(0)

du < 0. (38)
Since ˜ xλ(0) = 1
1+µ
β
α
, (38) holds true iﬀ µ ≥ µ0 with µ0 = inf{µ ≥ 0 |
M(µ) ≤ 0} and M deﬁned by 36.
Finally recall that Φ(t) ≤ 0 iﬀ t ≤ t1. Let Λλ : [0,1] → R be deﬁned by
Λλ(t) =
Z t
0
∂xLλ(u,xλ(u))du
with xλ = ˜ xλ for t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) = t − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0) for t ≥ t0. We have
by construction, Λλ(t) = 0 for t ≤ t0, Λλ(1) = 0 and Λλ(t) = −Φ(t) ≤ 0
for t ≥ t0. Hence the suﬃcient optimality conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of
proposition 9 are fulﬁlled. xλ = ˜ xλ for t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) = t − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0) for
t ≥ t0 is the solution.
35We claim that if µ ≤ max{α
β(β − α − 1),µ0}, then xλ(t) = a + t with
0 < a < 1 determined by
µ = (1 − a)
Z 1
0
α(1 − u)α−1
a + u
du.
Indeed let
Λλ(t) =
Z t
0
∂xLλ(u,a + u))du =
Z t
0
λ

α(1 − u)α−1
a + u
− µβ
(1 − u)β−1
1 − a

du.
Let us ﬁrst determine a by the condition Λλ(1) = 0. Indeed Λλ(1) = 0 iﬀ
Hµ(a) =
Z 1
0

α(1 − u)α−1
a + u
− µβ
(1 − t)β−1
1 − a

du = 0. (39)
The function a → (1 − a)
R 1
0
α(1−u)α−1
a+u du being strictly decreasing on [0,1],
the solution to Hµ(a) = 0 is uniquely determined in function of µ. Note
further that if µ ≤ max{α
β(β −α−1),µ1}, from (39), Hµ(˜ xλ(0)) = Φ(0) > 0.
Since Hµ is decreasing with Hµ(1) = −∞, if Hµ(a) = 0, then ˜ xλ(0) < a < 1.
It may be veriﬁed that a+t > ˜ xλ(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ t and a+t < ˜ xλ(t) for t > t
for some t. Since ∂xLλ(u,·) is decreasing,
˙ Λλ(t) = ∂xLλ(t,a + t) < ∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0, t < t.
˙ Λλ(t) = ∂xLλ(t,a + t) > ∂xLλ(t, ˜ xλ(t)) = 0, t > t.
Since Λλ(0) = 0, Λλ(t) < Λλ(1) for all t ∈]0,1[ and the necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 9 are fulﬁlled. xλ(t) = a + t
with 0 < a < 1 is the optimal solution.
Proof of proposition 20
We ﬁrst check whether an equilibrium consumption can be of the type xλ =
˜ xλ for t ≤ t0 and xλ(t) = t − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0) for t ≥ t0. From (29) and (28), we
must have:
1
k
=
Z t0
0
α(1−t)
α−1

1 + µ
(1 − λ)β
λα
(1 − t)
β−α

dt+
Z 1
t0
α(1 − t)α−1(t + 1)
t − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0)
dt.
(40)
From (37),
(1 − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0))
Z 1
t0
α(1 − t)α−1
t − t0 + ˜ xλ(t0)
dt = µ(1 − t0)
β.
36Integrating (40), we obtain λ∗ = k.
We next check whether the equilibrium consumption can be of the type
xλ(t) = a + t. Then we must have:
1
k
=
Z 1
0
α(1 − t)α−1(t + 1)
t + a
dt = 1 + µ (41)
where the second equality follows from (39). Hence λ∗ = k. Assertions 2 and
3 then follow from proposition 19.
Proof of proposition 21
Let us now assume that the second agent has an epsilon-contaminated RDU
utility. We ﬁrst check whether an equilibrium consumption can be of the type
xλ(t) = t + x0 for t ≤ t0, xλ = ˜ xλ for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 and xλ(t) = t − t1 + ˜ xλ(t1)
for t ≥ t1.
Since xλ is increasing, the pricing density is proportional to
α(1−t)α−1
xλ(t) .
Equilibrium utility weight is given by:
1
k
=
Z t0
0
α(1 − t)
α−1 t + 1
t + x0
dt +
Z t1
t0
 
α(1 − t)
α−1 + µ(1 − t)
β−1(1 − ε)

dt
+
Z 1
t1
α(1 − t)α−1
t − t1 + ˜ xλ(t1)
dt. (42)
We further have Λλ(t0) = Λλ(t1) = Λλ(1) = −g0(xλ(0)) =
(1−λ)ε
1−x0 . Deﬁning
µ = 1−λ
λ , we thus have
ε
1 − x0
=
Z t0
0
(1 − t)α−1
µ(t + x0)
dt −
Z t0
0
β(1 − t)β−1(1 − ε)
1 − x0
dt. (43)
Z 1
t1
α(1 − t)α−1
t − t1 + ˜ xλ(t1)
dt − µ
Z 1
t1
β(1 − t)β−1(1 − ε)
t − t1 + ˜ xλ(t1)
dt = 0. (44)
Using (42) (43) and (44), one obtains 1
k = 1 + µ∗.
If the equilibrium consumption is of the type xλ(t) = a + t, then
1
k
=
Z 1
0
α(1 − t)α−1(t + 1)
t + a
dt. (45)
Since Λλ(1) = −g0(xλ(0)) =
(1−λ)ε
1−a , we also have:
(1 − λ)ε
1 − a
=
Z 1
0
α(1 − t)α−1
t + a
dt −
(1 − λ)(1 − ε)
1 − a
. (46)
37From (45) (46), we also obtain 1
k = 1+µ∗ or λ∗ = k as was to be proven.
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